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I. INTRODUCTION
Because the modern administrative agency combines execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial powers, various authorities throughout
history have argued that the fundamental structure of the admin-
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istrative system is unconstitutional.1 Recently, the relationship be-
tween the separation of powers doctrine and the administrative
state has returned to the foreground of both American politics and
constitutional law. Attempts by the current executive branch to
rein in the policy and rulemaking activities of "independent" fed-
eral agencies2 have resulted in both praise and cries of foul from
the legal community and Congress.' These attempts at executive
branch control have been precipitated by a perceived shift in the
United States Supreme Court's position on the separation of pow-
ers doctrine. The Court's recent decision striking down certain pro-
visions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act4 has
greatly increased the belief that the existence of independent agen-
cies is in danger.5 Moreover, a strong belief now exists that the
original functional justifications6 for the independent status of cer-
1. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH SPE-
CIAL STUDIES (1937). Early attacks on Congress' establishment of independent regulatory
commissions recomnmended the abolition of the "headless fourth branch" of government and
called for the separation of adjudicatory and prosecutory functions possessed by certain
agencies.
2. Independent regulatory agencies of the federal government generally are defined as
agencies outside the executive departments or those agencies whose head can be discharged
by the President only for cause. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 2.7 (1978).
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 lists 17 independent regulatory agencies, the most
prominent of which are the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Election Commission, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1)
(1982) (defining of independent agency under the Paperwork Reduction Act).
3. Attorney General Edwin Meese has suggested that the entire system of independent
agencies may be unconstitutional. According to Mr. Meese: 'Federal agencies performing
executive functions are themselves properly agents of the executive . . . .In the tripartite
scheme of government, a body with enforcement powers is part of the executive branch of
government." See Taylor, A Question of Power, A Powerful Questioner, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6,
1985, at 19, col. 9 (quoting Meese's September 1985 speech concerning independent agen-
cies). Mr. Meese would include those agencies currently considered independent in the exec-
utive branch. In addition, former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairman, and current
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director James Miller has stated that, with re-
spect to rulemaking, he does not believe there are any "independent" agencies. Id.; see also,
Letter from Edwin Meese III to Editor, N.Y. Times, reprinted in N.Y. Times, May 13, 1985,
at 12. Mr. Miller, President Reagan's appointee to head the FTC (an independent agency)
also has referred to the idea of an independent agency as a "myth." See ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LEGISLATIVE VETO OF AGENCY RULES AFTER INS v.
CHADHA 18 (1983).
4. The Act's popular name "Gramm-Rudman," refers to its two principal draftsmen,
Senators Phil Gramm of Texas and Warren B. Rudman of New Hampshire. For purposes of
this Note "Gramm-Rudman" is used in substitution for the Act's formal title, Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037
(1985).
5. See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
6. The original justification for agency independence from the executive was an intent
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tain agencies have collapsed, taking with them any possible justifi-
cation for excluding these agencies from the President's control.'
This Note will demonstrate that wholesale rejection of the
need for the independence of certain administrative agencies is un-
warranted. Careful analysis of the most recent cases addressing the
independence issue reveals that the constitutional notion of sepa-
ration of powers can co-exist with the notion of the independent
agency. While recent Supreme Court decisions8 have stressed the
need for strict separation of the three named branches and have
declared unconstitutional specific attempts to further the scope of
the administrative state, they have not precluded the existence of a
properly created independent agency.
To preserve the existing administrative structure of govern-
ment, future decisions on the independent agencies' place in gov-
ernment should focus on a strict separation of powers at the apex
of government and on a flexible "checks and balances" model be-
low that apex. By recognizing that independent agencies are not a
fourth branch, but are a product of Congress, and that their crea-
tion and operation are fully subject to the checks and balances in-
herent in the Constitution, the Court will enhance the ability of
the government to adapt to societal change. Such an interpretation
will preserve the agencies' accountability and secure the authority
of the separate branches.
This Note examines the future of independent administrative
agencies following recent Supreme Court decisions that have fo-
cused on the separation of powers and the administrative state.
on the part of Congress "to create a body of experts who shall gain experience by length of
service." Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935). Professor Landis
states that "[T]he advantages of specialization in the field of regulatory activity seem obvi-
ous enough .... [Tlhe art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of the details of its
operation, ability to shift requirements as the condition of the industry may dictate." J.
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24 (1938). Landis believes that the only way to
achieve this expertise is through "long continuance" in office. Id. at 23; see infra notes 9-24
and accompanying text.
7. See generally Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive
Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court decision in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and the perceived functional similarity between Executive and
independent agencies counsel for incorporation of the independent agencies into the Execu-
tive branch). See also Ablard, American Bar Association Section of Administrative Law
Report to the House of Delegates, A.BA. SEC. ADMIN. L. (1986) [hereinafter ABA Proposal
100] (arguing that the President's "Opinions in Writing" power of Article II allows Execu-
tive Control over independent agencies); ABA COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FED-
ERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 84 (1979) [hereinafter ROADS].




Section II of this Note discusses the historical justification for the
development of the independent status of certain agencies. Section
II also reviews early Supreme Court decisions regarding the place
of independent agencies in government. Section III identifies and
responds to current attacks on the functional justifications for the
independent status of certain federal agencies. Section IV discusses
the Constitutional issues regarding independent agencies and ana-
lyzes recent Supreme Court opinions addressing the place of ad-
ministrative agencies in government. Section V concludes that al-
though independent agencies have been criticized and their ability
to function independently has been questioned, independent agen-
cies should remain in the present governmental structure and
should be afforded the political insulation established by Congress.
II. THE CREATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND THE
INDEPENDENT AGENCY
A. Early Federal Regulatory Agencies
"The rise of the administrative process parallels the develop-
ment of the United States into a large, complex, and industrialized
nation."' Burgeoning economic development led Congress to be-
lieve that specialized regulation was required in a changing econ-
omy. 10 This regulation must encompass notions of flexibility, con-
tinuity, and expertise. This belief fostered Congress' decision to
delegate economic regulation to subordinate agencies. Congress
delegated legislative powers to these agencies, granting them the
capability to enact, after consideration of pertinent factual circum-
stances, specific regulations to further Congress' policy decisions.1
The establishment in 1887 of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC) marked the beginning of modern administrative reg-
ulation. The ICC represented the first governmental regulator that
9. P. WOLL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (1983).
10. Many justifications are given for the decision to delegate economic regulation to a
subordinate agency rather than to one of the three enumerated branches of government.
The belief that regulatory expertise was needed in a narrowly defined area and that courts,
from an adjudicatory standpoint, were incapable of developing this experetise was a primary
reason for establishing administrative agencies. The requirement of flexibility in regulation
has been offered as a premise for the decision to delegate legislative powers to the adminis-
trative agency. See generally id. at 5-8.
11. Id. It has been said that "[tihe early agencies were created because practical men
were seeking practical answers to immediate problems." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10
(1951).
[Vol. 40:903
1987] INDEPENDENT AGENCY 907
was concerned solely with the welfare of a vital national industry.
12
Congress vested the ICC with broad rulemaking, adjudication, and
enforcement powers; subsequently, the ICC has become the model
for the modern administrative agency.' 3 Although a major step in
the development of an administrative state, this delegation of au-
thority was not without constitutional foundation. The Supreme
Court previously had upheld Congress' ability to transfer both leg-
islative14 and rulemaking 5 authority to an agency.
The New Deal era represented the next major phase in the
development of administrative law. Responding to the collapse of
the economy during the Great Depression, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's New Deal drastically expanded the federal govern-
ment's inteivention in economic affairs and laid the foundation for
a national welfare state.'6 The creation of agencies to oversee im-
portant sectors of the economy was representative of the action
taken by the executive branch "to save capitalism from itself.'1
7
Both the Securities and Exchange Commission' s and the National
Labor Relations Board 9 were created during the New Deal in re-
sponse to perceived failures in the financial and labor markets. Ini-
tial fears concerning Congress' delegations of power caused certain
statutes to be held unconstitutional as overly broad delegations of
12. J. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 10. The creation of the ICC was the inevitable result of
the Supreme Court's decision to prevent state regulation of the railroads. See Wabash, St.
L. & P. R.R. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). The ICC, however, was not the first federal
regulatory agency. The creation of administrative agencies began at the very first session of
Congress. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE 8 (1941). These early agencies later would become the Bureau of Customs and the
Veterans Administration. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.10, at 21-22 (2d ed.
1984).
13. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 21-22.
14. See The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813) (upholding Congress' power to
transfer its legislative function).
15. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (upholding the power
of Congress to delegate to the Supreme Court the ability to regulate judicial practice).
16. See K. DAvis, supra note 11, at 6-7.
17. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 30 (1985).
The decision was made that the legislative process was "ill-suited for handling masses of
detail, or for applying ...the ideas supplied by scientists or other professional advisers.
.... [O]ur legislative bodies [have] developed [a] system of legislating only the main out-
lines of programs . . . and leaving to administrative agencies the tasks of working out sub-
sidiary policies." K. DAVIS, supra note 11, § 3 at 13.
18. The Securities and Exchange Commission was created under authority of the Se-
curities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78jj (1982)).
19. The National Labor Relations Board is an independent agency created by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
168 (1982)).
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authority.20 This judicially created2 1 constraint on agency authority
has not weathered the test of time and now appears to be "dead, or
at least 'moribund.' ,122
The New Deal era's deferential attitude toward Congress'
delegations of authority, however, is not shared by the current Ex-
ecutive. Unlike the New Deal era, in which both the legislative and
executive branches were committed to the idea of economic control
through the "expert professionalism of administrators, '23 today the
two branches disagree on the propriety of delegating the power to
shape the focus and structure of the federal government.24
20. See Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
21. The nondelegation doctrine involved in Schecter is wholly judge-made. "[llnsofar
as it is asserted to be a principle of constitutional law [the doctrine] is built upon the thin-
nest of implication, or is the product of the unwritten super-constitution." Duff & White-
side, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 14
CORNELL L.Q. 168, 196 (1929). The fact that the Supreme Court has recognized delegation of
authority as a legitimate congressional act indicates that decisions condemning a particular
delegation represent policy determinations on the part of the Supreme Court, arguably the
inappropriate branch to determine such policy.
22. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1384 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher
v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). The Supreme Court has invoked the nondelegation doctrine
to invalidate a federal statute only three times in history-twice in 1935 (Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935)) and once in 1936 (Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)). Some commenta-
tors have concluded that the nondelegation doctrine "continues to live a fugitive existence
at the edge of constitutional jurisprudence." Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 17 (1982). But see Goldsmith, INS v. Chadha
and the Nondelegation Doctrine: A Speculation, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 749 (arguing that
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), has brought new life to the nondelegation doctrine).
The Supreme Court's recent decision, Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986), however,
may signal the end of the doctrine's continued vitality. See id. at 3193 & n.10.
23. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 17, at 31. The theory of agency expertise
dominated academic notions of administrative law after 1935. See Stewart, The Reforma-
tion of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1676-81 (1975).
As recently as 1968, both the President and Congress recognized the need to promote
the ideas of expert administrators. The United States Postal Service was removed from the
Executive branch and given independent status in 1970. The reasons given for the change
included the need to remove the appointments and promotions processes from partisan
politics and "move to a completely professional postal personnel system." REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON POSTAL ORGANIZATION: TOWARDS POSTAL EXCELLENCE 58 (1968).
However, in a more politically volatile setting, the "for cause" removal requirement which
indentifies an agency as independent was rejected. See H.R. REP. No. 197, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1989, 1992-93 (rejecting the "for
cause" requirement in the Civil Rights Commission).
24. The most celebrated example of a dispute between the branches of government
over administrative law occurred after the Carter Coal decision in 1936. Many viewed the
Supreme Court's invalidation of the National Recovery Act as a policy decision regarding
the New Deal. This political turmoil surrounding the Carter Coal decision initiated the
Court Packing Plan under which President Roosevelt and his supporters in Congress at-
tempted to reduce the Supreme Court's ability to thwart popular will and economic recov-
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B. Judicial Acceptance of the Independent Agency
Congress' most effective method for insulating an agency's
rulemaking and policy judgments from executive intrusion is to
limit the opportunities the Executive has for removing agency ad-
ministrators. The administrative heads of federal agencies typically
have discretion over the agency's rulemaking and policymaking
agenda and, therefore, can influence greatly the agency's impact on
society.25 Thus, decisions that expound on the removal power of
the Executive are the logical starting point for comprehending the
constitutionality of agency independence because if independent
agencies are not protected from unlimited removal by the Execu-
tive, the agencies' independence would be a sham.
1. Myers v. United States
The Supreme Court's decision in Myers v. United States2 is
recognized as the birthplace of contemporary analysis of the Exec-
utive's removal power. In Myers the Supreme Court invalidated a
long-standing statute that required the President to seek the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate before removing a Postmaster from
office. The majority's extremely formalistic opinion, written by
Chief Justice and former President Taft,2Semphasized the Presi-
dent's need for complete control over the Executive branch.2 This
control, according to the Court, was needed to ensure the uniform
and unitary execution of the law. Chief Justice Taft recognized the
Senate's express constitutional power to consent to the appoint-
ment of a postmaster and to define the qualifications and terms for
ery by adding pro-executive Justices to the Court.
25. While the administrative head will have significant influence on the activities of
the agency, this influence is not unchecked. Congressional amendments to the agency's ena-
bling legislation can sharpen the agency's focus. This amending legislation must, however,
survive Presidential approval, which helps to insure that the agencies truly are independent.
Because no one branch of government can control these activities, the agencies can conduct
their activities relatively free of the influence of partisan politics but still within the limits
of the Constitution. One such limit is judicial review. By allowing this process to exist, Con-
gress can regulate the particular industries by delegating authority to expert apolitical heads
of departments without sacrificing the goals of separation of powers.
26. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
27. Id. at 135.
28. The Chief Justice stressed a very strict separation of the powers of government
theory in his opinion. "[T]he reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the
branches should be kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended
.... " Id. at 116.




that office.30 Nevertheless, the Court noted that the President had
an implied power of removal, free from congressional limitation,
which was based on the need to direct the actions of executive of-
ficers. The Chief Justice, however, did acknowledge that the extent
of presidential control over a subordinate was determined by the
statute creating the subordinate position.3' Chief Justice Taft also
recognized that when quasi-judicial duties of executive officers
were involved, the possibility of limiting the President's removal
power existed.32
The majority's conciliatory concluding statements regarding
limitations on the Executive's removal power did not appease the
dissenters in Myers. Focusing on what he considered a "cautious
view of executive power"33 held by the framers of the Constitution,
Justice Brandeis' dissent argued that an unrestricted presidential
removal power would create a political spoils system out of the
civil service laws by denying individuals in public service protec-
tion from removal at the whim of the President.3 4 Justice McRey-
nold's dissent stated that, while logic might support the majority's
holding that cabinet officers not be protected from unlimited re-
moval, the Court had yet to decide whether commissioners of some
independent agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) or the ICC, were protected similarly.
3
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. "Congress shall have Power. . .To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution. . .all. . .Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Of-
ficer thereof."
31. Myers, 272 U.S. at 132.
The Court stated:
But it is contended that executive officers. . . are bound by the statutory law, and are
not his servants to do his will, and that his obligation to care for the faithful execution
of the laws does not authorize him to treat them as such. The degree of guidance in the
discharge of their duties that the President may exercise over executive officers varies
with the character of their service as prescribed in the law under which they act.
Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 135. "[Tlhere may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the
discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the President may overrule
... the officer. . . ... Id.; accord United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260
(1954).
33. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 477
(1979).
34. Myers, 272 U.S. at 275-78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 181-82 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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2. Humphrey's Executor v. United States
In Humphrey's Executor v. United States 6 the Supreme
Court responded to Justice McReynold's questions, holding uncon-
stitutional an attempt by President Franklin Roosevelt to dismiss,
without cause, an FTC commissioner. The FTC's enabling statute
limited the reasons for dismissal of a commissioner by the Presi-
dent3'7 and set the terms of office for commissioners. A unanimous
Court failed to emphasize the difference between the instant stat-
ute and the statute in Myers.3 8 Instead, the Court argued that the
President's broad removal power over members of the executive
branch did not apply to the FTC Commissioner because he was
not within the executive branch.39 Thus, the "headless fourth
branch" of government was created.40
To justify the conclusion that the FTC Commissioner was not
within the executive branch and, therefore, not subject to removal
at the will of the President, the Court focused on the congressional
intent in creating the FTC. The Court found that Congress in-
tended to create "a body of experts who [should] gain experience
by length of service."'1 After careful consideration of the legislative
reports in both houses of Congress, the Court determined that
Congress' goal was to create a nonpartisan Commission. The Com-
mission was to exercise predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-leg-
islative functions. 2 Congress' intent was to create "a body which
shall be independent of the executive authority, except in its se-
lection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hin-
drance of any other official . . . of the government. ' 43 The Court
plainly stated that, while not all quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative
power must be exercised in an independent atmosphere, Congress
has the power to insulate those to whom it delegates this power.44
36. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
37. The prescribed reasons for the President's removal of an FTC Commissioner are
"inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982).
38. The statute in Myers required advice and consent of the Senate before the Post-
master could be fired; the statute in Humphrey required mere cause in the case of an FTC
Commissioner.
39. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 625-26.
40. See Bruff, supra note 33, at 479.
41. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 625.
42. Id. at 629.
43. Id. at 625 (emphasis in original).
44. "The authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies,
to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot
well be doubted . . . ." Id. at 629.
1987]
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Here, in contrast to the situation in Myers, Congress created
an atmosphere of independence without encroaching on the power
of the Executive. 45 The Court reiterated that, like the President,
Congress did not have complete control over all aspects of the
FTC. The President's power of appointment46 clearly applied to
the FTC.47 While the Court's formal language paid homage to the
separation of powers doctrine,4s the result exemplified a more flexi-
ble approach to the shape and form of government below the apex
of power.
3. Wiener v. United States
The most recent discussion of presidential removal power ap-
peared in Wiener v. United States.49 In Wiener the Court voided
President Eisenhower's attempt to remove a member of the War
Claims Commission. While Congress had established the Commis-
sion to serve for a specified number of years,5" no method for the
removal of its members had been specified.
In a unanimous opinion the Court held that Congress' creation
of an agency whose determinations were "not subject to review by
any other official of the United States" precluded the President's
removal of agency members at will. 1 The Court stressed the Com-
mission's obligation to adjudicate claims presented according to
the War Claims Act of 1948.52 Relying on the majority opinion in
Humphrey's Executor,53 the Court distinguished between execu-
tive officials, removable by virtue of the President's constitutional
powers, and those officials who are members of a body created to
exercise judgment free from interference from any other govern-
45. Id. at 630.
46. U.S. CoNsT. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
47. See Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 625.
48. According to the Court "[tihe fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the
three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influ-
ence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to
serious question." Id. at 629. The fact that the Court expanded its analysis beyond the
actual text of the Constitution indicates a willingness to allow the government to evolve. As
long as the structural norms preventing one branch from usurping power from the others
through the system of checks and balances are followed, the intent of the framers will re-
main safe.
49. 357 U.S. 349 (1957).
50. The Commission was established for a period of three years. Id. at 351.
51. Id. at 354-55.
52. War Claims Act of 1948, ch. 826, 60 Stat. 1240.
53. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
[Vol. 40:903
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ment official.5' The Court showed little respect for the argument
that Congress' failure to provide for removal was an implicit grant
of removal power to the President.
55
Conspicuously absent from the Court's opinion was the obliga-
tory reference to the formal separation of powers doctrine. Al-
though this decision emphasizes the "bright line" drawn between
agency officials who are vested with nonexecutive functions and
those who are not, the opinion further supports a flexible approach
to the form of government permissible under the Constitution. As
in Humphrey's Executor, the Wiener Court demonstrated that
Congress, through validly adopted legislation, may create a flexible
form of government below the three recognized branches of gov-
ernment without violating the spirit of the Constitution.5 6
In both Wiener and Humphrey's Executor the Supreme Court
recognized the ability of the Constitution to adjust to the contours
of society. This attitude was initially outlined in the Steel Seizure
Case.57 In Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown,
which has become the starting block for modern separation of pow-
ers analysi, 58 the powers of the President were painted as being
flexible and fluctuating with the will of Congress. 59 This emphasis
on flexibility led Justice Jackson to develop his famous three cate-
gories of presidential power, each focusing on the degree of conflict
between the executive and legislative branches and the constitu-
tional foundation supporting each.e0 This flexible approach also
54. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 353. The Court stressed "that one who holds his office only
during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of inde-
pendence against the latter's will." Id. (quoting Humphrey's Executer, 295 U.S. at 629).
55. According to the Court "we are compelled to conclude, that no such [removal]
power is given to the President directly by the Constitution, and none is impliedly conferred
upon him by statute simply because Congress said nothing about it." 357 U.S. at 356.
56. See supra note 48.
57. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
58. See Bruff, supra note 33, at 472.
59. According to Justice Jackson, the President's powers "fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
60. Id. at 635-38. The categories are designed to guide decisionmaking and not to be-
come a fixed state of law. Jackson believed that the President's powers were strongest when
he acted pursuant to an express or implied grant of authority from Congress. In this situa-
tion the President possessed both executive and legislative power to act. Jackson argued
that the President's power was at its weakest when acting in opposition to congressional
intent. Actions in this category were valid only when made in reliance on the exclusive Exec-
utive power and were to be viewed with caution so as to prevent a tyrannical Executive
branch. Jackson's final category, known as the "zone of twilight," existed when Congress
had not acted in the area; Jackson believed that the facts of the particular situation would
determine the breadth of the President's authority.
1987] 913
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was applied to the President's enumerated powers, requiring all
constitutional issues to be resolved after consulting the entire text
of the Constitution, not merely "isolated clauses or even single Ar-
ticles torn from context. 6 1 Justice Jackson also stated that
"[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure lib-
erty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government.
'6 2
Justice Jackson's interpretation of the checks and balances in
the Constitution would allow the legislative branch to shape and
focus the administrative portion of the federal government. The
Constitution is silent on the subject of government below the
"apex" of powers, 3 but this silence should not preclude congres-
sional action shaping the government below the apex. The exis-
tence of independent agencies neither violates the structural
checks and balances of the Constitution nor upsets the balance of
powers. 4 Presidential control over these agencies would be "in-
compatible with the express . . . will of Congress. ' 65 Allowing the
President to exercise power over the independent agencies would
risk upsetting the constitutionally established equilibrium. Only
when acts of Congress place this equilibrium at risk should execu-
tive control be permitted.
III. THE FUNCTIONAL JUSTIFICATION: INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
TODAY
The Supreme Court's justification for raising an administra-
tive agency to the level of a "fourth branch" of government relies
on the intent of Congress to provide for "apolitical" rulemaking
61. Id. at 635.
62. Id.
63.. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984). Strauss concludes that while strict separation
of powers is necessary only at the apex of the governmental powers, functional needs call for
incorporation of the independent agencies into the Executive branch. This Note will demon-
strate that experience has not borne out the ability of the Executive to allow "apolitical"
decisionmaking to exist in Executive agencies and, therefore, that the independence that
Congress intended should be honored. See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing the effect independent
agency establishment has on the checks and balances in the Constitution).
65. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). This analysis would place
the conflict in Justice Jackson's second category-President's action in express derogation
of congressional intent. The President's powers are weakest in this category.
66. These characteristics include removal for cause only, and appointment for 12 years
so that a term spans longer than any one President's term of office. See also supra notes 32-
56 and accompanying text.
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and adjudication in a forum of its own designation. As evidenced
by case law, the President's power to serve as the unitary and ac-
countable Chief Executive requires that Congress vest these agen-
cies with specific characteristics to avoid presidential control.
Recent attacks on the constitutionality of the "independent"
status of these agencies have focused on a perceived disappearance
of the functional justification critical to continued independence.
Specifically, these attacks cite the agencies' failure to attract ex-
pert administrators, to remain impartial in their decisionmaking,
and to provide adequately for agency accountability.6 7
An agency's ability to attract "experts" is controlled by two
factors: (1) the ability of the agency to compete economically in
the job market and (2) the atmosphere present within the agency.68
As most criticisms of the agencies demonstrate, Congress is pri-
marily responsible for allowing agencies to compete economically
for the so-called "expert administrator. 6 9 Congress' decision to
create and vest in an agency the power to make the economic deci-
sions necessary to further stated legislative goals necessitates a
commitment to fund that agency competitively to attract qualified
administrators. Thus, the economic competitiveness of an agency
rests squarely with Congress.
In addition to economic competitiveness, an agency's per-
ceived status in government is an important factor in attracting
promising expert administrators. That status, however, generally is
elevated only during periods of emergency for that particular sec-
tor of the national economy. Not coincidentally, this is the same
period in which congressional funding typically peaks.70 This
process results in a vicious cycle which, however, may serve to allo-
cate "expert administrators" where they are best suited at a partic-
ular point in time. Private industry obviously would have a greater
attraction to industry experts during those periods when govern-
ment regulation is unnecessary and funding is at an ebb.71
67. See generally Note, supra note 7, at 1768-71.
68. See W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 87 (1967).
69. See id. at 87. Mr. Cary argues that in addition to the financial considerations, the
agencies' activities, which focus on growth as opposed to maintenance, are also a very im-
portant factor. He maintains that this is somewhat of a vicious cycle because with extra
funding the agency will have the opportunity for expanding programs but without the
funds, the agencies activities will be restricted to "putting out fires." See also Jaffe, The
Independent Agency-A New Scapegoat, 65 YALE L.J. 1068, 1072 (1956).
70. See W. CARY, supra note 68, at 87-88.
71. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 17, at 172. It is illogical to allocate large
sums of additional funding to a sector of the national economy that is operating at an ac-
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Certain agencies whose activities focus on problems of social
choice, such as the Social Security Administration, have a less le-
gitimate claim to the need for an expert administrator to make
policy decisions7 2 than agencies such as the FTC, the SEC, or the
Federal Reserve Board (FRB), which make legal, economic, and fi-
nancial decisions. The latter category of decisions requires expert
decisionmakers who are immune from the political process. Inde-
pendence is necessary to ensure that the decisionmaking process
achieves uniform application and adherence to congressional pol-
icy. Technical decisions involving economic or scientific factors are
best left outside the political arena because of the potential for
abuse from those with a financial stake in regulation. 73 The poten-
tial for abuse is greatest when an industry is able to influence
agency activity through extensive lobbying or through the appoint-
ment of industry sympathizers to administrative positions. This
situation often leads to the regulated industry controlling the regu-
lator or to "capture"7 4 of the agency. A buffer to the vagaries of
partisan politics is provided to the technical staff and deci-
sionmakers through the independent status of the agency heads.
To blame industry capture of an agency on the administrators
again is to focus criticism on the wrong target. Although not totally
to blame, Congress, through its advice and consent power over
presidential appointments, should be held partially responsible.
The Senate's failure to use its advice and consent power has re-
sulted in many "captured" appointees7 5 commanding agency posi-
tions. Congress' ability to prevent industry "capture" of agencies
ceptable level without government intervention. It is unlikely, however, that at any given
point in time all aspects of the national economy will be operating adequately thereby justi-
fying removal of all government regulation. It is possible that during specific time periods
specific agencies will lack the requisite "sexiness" to attract expert administrators. The fail-
ure of a particular agency to attract expert administrators, however, is not a persuasive
argument for incorporation into the Executive branch of an entire class of decision makers.
72. Id. at 128.
73. The necessity of expert decisionmaking was recognized in a judicial context most
recently by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Synar v. United
States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181
(1986) ("[W]e note that the economic calculation standards, which might seem vague and
confusing to laymen, will have more precise meaning to officials accustomed to making such
determinations."). See also Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940).
74. See W. CARY, supra note 68, at 67. "Irrespective. . .of the absence of undue hos-
pitality, it is the daily machine-gun-like impact on both agency and its staff of industry
representation that makes for industry orientation on the part of many honest and capable
agency members .... SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES
TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 72 (1960) [hereinafter REPORT].
75. REPORT, supra note 74, at 67.
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by rejecting Executive appointments quite possibly has been ex-
panded by recent Supreme Court interpretations of the advice and
consent authority.
The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo,7" uphold-
ing the President's exclusive right to control appointments of gov-
ernment officers, also ensures that Congress will not be left out of
the appointments process. 77 The Court defined "Officer" as "all
persons who ... hold an office under the government .... exer-
cising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States.''77 This expanded definition gives Congress the ability to
expand its advice and consent power.79 Through the use of this ex-
panded power, the pre-"capture" of a greater number of agency
appointees possibly can be avoided. 0 As the diversity of interests
in the Senate far exceeds that in the executive branch, this power
represents a major step in avoiding politicized decisionmaking.
While the agencies may be subject to much criticism, Congress'
failure to provide for and protect the agencies adequately is at
least an equal problem.
A final attack on the justifications for independent agencies is
the lack of coordination and accountability among the agencies.8 1
To remedy these problems, most commentators advocate increased
participation by the Executive in the regulatory process.8 2 The Ex-
76. 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
77. Id. at 143.
78. Id. at 126.
79. U.S. CONST. art 2, § 2, cl. 2. All early commentary on the Buckley decision focused
on the fact that it appeared to close a loophole Congress had for appointing "inferior of-
ficers" to agency positions. This Note argues that Buckley is simply another recognition by
the Supreme Court of the inherent checks and balances of the Constitution. As between the
three highest levels of the federal government, a strict separation is necessary and is accom-
plished by adhering to the provisions of the Constitution in a formalistic manner. Below this
apex of authority, as long as the Constitution's terms are followed, however, flexibility
should be permitted. The Buckley Court determined that Congress was attempting to evade
the structure of the document by appointing Officers to the Federal Elections Commission
and therefore was quite justified in holding that this was a usurpation of the President's
appointment power. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 7, at
1777.
80. See W. CARY, supra note 68, at 67.
81. See generally ROADS, supra note 7, at 84; Bruff, supra note 33; Strauss, supra note
63; Note, supra note 7.
82. Not surprisingly, the degree of intervention into the activities of the independent
agencies is a politically sensitive subject. While the President has not attempted to force
independent agencies to comply with any of the Executive Orders designed to increase pres-
idential input into the rulemaking procedures of the Executive branch agencies, many com-




ecutive, however, has not clearly demonstrated its ability to in-
crease participation in the functioning of independent agencies and
still comply with Congress' intent in creating these agencies-to
provide expert decisionmaking in an apolitical atmosphere.
83
Numerous accounts of executive interference with both execu-
tive and independent agency activities have made administrators
in these agencies wary of further executive involvement84 in the
activities of independent agencies. An example of this type of in-
terference is found in the saga of the passive restraint system for
automobiles. Henry Ford II reportedly made a personal visit to the
Nixon White House in 1971 to complain about the effect of federal
regulations on the Ford Pinto.s5 As a result of his plea for help,
presidential aides John Ehrlichman and Peter Flanigan ordered
the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, the
Department of Transportation, and the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to delay regulations requiring the passive restraints in favor of
cheaper and arguably less effective alternatives.8 8 While the idea of
coordinated rulemaking is admirable, activities by the executive
branch opposing Congress' desires for expert decisionmaking
within the executive branch do not bode well for those in the inde-
pendent agencies.
The experiences of the Environmental Protection Agency
President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291 establishes a centralized mechanism for
presidential management of agency rulemaking activities that gives the President substan-
tial authority to intervene at all stages of the the rulemaking process. Under the Order, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is authorized to be part of an agency's rule for-
mulation process and apply a cost-benefit analysis to any proposed "major" rules. The effec-
tiveness of the rules is delayed until OMB satisfaction is achieved or an appeal to the Presi-
dent is made. See M. ROSENBERG, OMB AND AGENCY RULEMAKINGS: A DESCRIPTION OF THE
REGULATORY REVIEW PROCESS UNDER E.O. 12498 AND 12291, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SER-
VICE (1985).
83. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
84. While there are documented accounts of direct presidential involvement in agency
activity, the majority of Executive involvement has come through OMB. OMB is responsible
for overseeing federal spending and agency proposals both for rules and for legislation. "Al-
though it is often called the most powerful agency in the United States Government, the
Office of Management and Budget remains somewhat mysterious to Congress and the Pub-
lic." J. PARIS, THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET BACKGROUND, RESPONSIBILITIES, RE-
CENT ISSUES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, at i (1978). The OMB was established in
the Executive Office of the President pursuant to Reorganization Plan 2 of 1970, 5 U.S.C. §
903 (1982). The Director of OMB is appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. 31 U.S.C. § 502 (1982).
85. See Bruff, supra note 33, at 466 (quoting SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGA-
TIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL REGULATION
AND REGULATORY REFORM 187-88 (Subcomm. Print 1976)).
86. Bruff, supra note 33, at 466.
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(EPA), a "quasi-independent"8 7 agency, are an excellent example
of the lack of deference the executive branch gives Congress' at-
tempts to achieve reasoned decisionmaking. While Congress argua-
bly intended to insulate the EPA from the vagaries of partisan
politics,88 the EPA's past experience has demonstrated otherwise.
Recent congressional reports have identified incidents of the Exec-
utive's interference, through the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), in asbestos regulations. According to Congress, the OMB
exercised its review authority, 9 "in 'an unlawful abuse of power,'
to force the EPA to withdraw asbestos regulations that had been
under consideration for more than five years.90 By forcing the EPA
to "capitulat[e] to pressure"91 the Executive has demonstrated how
it intends to treat delegations of scientific rulemaking authority to
agencies.
In addition to unreasonably influencing agency rulemaking,
the Executive has used the OMB to influence rulemaking through
ex parte contacts9 2 with agency decisionmakers. The effects of ex
parte contacts are numerous. For example, ex parte contacts have
been determined to undermine the public participation require-
ments for rulemaking contained in the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA),9 3 hamper judicial review, detract from factual decision-
making, and undermine accountability in government. 4
According to some commentators, the problem of accountabil-
87. The Environmental Protection Agency is seen as "quasi" independent because it
was established in the Executive branch as an independent agency pursuant to Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 3 of 1970. See UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1984/85 at 480.
88. See, Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervi-
sion of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA.
J. NAT. RES. L. 1, 20 (1984).
89.The. review authority is authorized under Executive Order 12,291, 5 U.S.C. § 601
Note (1982), 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
90. Peterson, OMB Illegally Blocked EPA Plan for Asbestos Ban, Report Says, Wash.
Post, Oct. 4, 1985, at A21, cols. 7-13.
91. Id.
92. Ex parte contacts generally are considered unannounced, private, and off-the-rec-
ord contacts with agency decision makers by those outside the decisionmaking process.
These contacts are prohibited in formal agency rulemakings. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1982).
A former General Counsel for the EPA has stated that "an attorney who is representing
a client on regulatory matters borders on incompetence if he or she does not use OMB to
attempt to moderate the regulations." See Olson, supra note 88, at 55-56 (quoting Role of
OMB in Regulation: Hearings of the Oversight and Investigations Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1981)).
93. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982).
94. For an excellent discussion of the impact of OMB's ex parte contacts with the
EPA, see Olson, supra note 88, at 30-35.
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ity and control of the independent agencies has been exaggerated."
Described as "stepchildren whose custody is contested by both
Congress and the Executive, but without very much affection from
either one,""6 independent agencies are constrained by many fac-
tors. The most significant of the systemic factors preventing inde-
pendent agencies from obtaining too much power are the bicamer-
alism and presentment requirements of the Constitution. 7 Agency
authority is derived from statutes, which, to be properly created,
must be presented to and approved by the President. Overly broad
delegations of power or policy judgments that are contrary to the
Executive's own policy can be rejected at this stage of the
process.""
Yet another check on the independent agencies by both Con-
gress and the Executive is the control of funds vested in the two
named branches. By refusing to consider advice from either the
Executive or Congress, an independent agency risks presidential
veto or a drastic reduction in funding.9 In addition to threatening
an agency's budget, Congress also may amend or repeal the
agency's enabling statute. Although concededly broad, these meth-
ods of maintaining accountability of the independent agencies are
enumerated in the Constitution, are available to the three named
branches of government, and do not reduce or infringe upon the
authority of any of the three branches.100
95. See W. CARY, supra note 68, at 4.
96. Id.
97. "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States ....
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
98. This was the flaw with the legislative veto, ruled unconstitutional in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The attempt by Congress to circumvent the requirements of
the Constitution could effectively negate the appointments clause power of the President.
Because the legislative veto avoids presentment to the President, Congress could thwart
regulatory actions taken by an appointee of a hostile President. The use of the legislative
veto to control administrative agencies is the factual background for the Chadha decision.
This reasoning again demonstrates the capabilities of the Constitution to allow for indepen-
dent agencies. It also points out the fact that once an agency is deemed independent it
should be allowed to remain so by both branches of government. This was one of the
problems with the Gramm-Rudman statute. By examining to the provisions of the Constitu-
tion as a whole, it is impossible to see the possibilities for flexibility while maintaining the
balance of powers. However, when one branch attempts to usurp the power of another, a
strict view of the checks and balances of the Constitution is needed to safeguard the struc-
ture of government.
99. See Strauss, supra note 63, at 586.
100. In addition, the appointments power is also a check available to the Executive,
but it is one that is tempered by the senatorial advice and consent power. See infra text
accompanying note 119, where it will be argued that incorporation of the agencies would
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Congress already has addressed the need for central adminis-
trative procedures throughout the agencies. The General Service
Administration (GSA) handles the procurement, office space, and
contract needs of all agencies.10' In addition, the Office of Person-
nel Management'0 2 and the Merit Systems Protection Board'0
3
designate employment and pay scale guidelines for all agencies.
Thus, to the extent deemed necessary, Congress has provided for
administrative efficiency without subjecting the independent agen-
cies' decisionmaking powers to the vagaries of partisan politics.
The notion that Congress, through the independent agencies, has a
weapon or a loophole by which it can usurp control of the govern-
ment from the President is inaccurate. Through the system of ap-
pointments, 10 4 as well as the process by which legislation and ap-
propriations are passed,'0 5 both Congress and the President have
sufficient control over the agencies to make them accountable
without upsetting the precarious balance of powers.
IV. THE CONTINUED ACCEPTANCE OF THE INDEPENDENT AGENCY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
A. Buckley v. Valeo
Recent Supreme Court opinions have been interpreted as rep-
resenting a shift of the Court away from a flexible approach re-
garding separation of powers issues toward a formal and unforgiv-
ing interpretation of the constitutional position of the three named
branches of government. The decision in Buckley v. Valeo'0 6 is
considered an example of this shift.
In Buckley the Court ruled that a congressional attempt to
appoint voting' 07 members of the Federal Elections Commission
(FEC)' 0 8 was an unconstitutional usurpation of the Executive's ap-
render Congress subservient to the Executive because incorporation would, from a prag-
matic standpoint, prevent Congress from shaping the form of the administrative agencies, a
power given to it under the necessary and proper clause.
101. See Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-
544 (1982).
102. See 5 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982) (Office of Personnel Management).
103. See id. §§ 1205-1206 (Merit Systems Protection Board).
104. See supra note 46.
105. See supra note 97.
106. 424 U.S. 1 (1975) (per curiam).
107. Only six of the Commission's members were authorized to vote on rulemaking of
adjudicatory matters.
108. 2 U.S.C. § 437(c) (1982).
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pointment power.10 9 The statute creating the FEC provided that
two of the six voting members be appointed by the Speaker of the
House, two by the President pro tempore of the Senate, and two
by the President. The Court found that, as drafted, the statute
permitted an unconstitutional appointment of an "officer" of the
United States by one other than the Executive. 110
Central to the Court's opinion and to the continued viability
of independent agencies was the establishment of a definition of
"officer" under the Constitution.' The Court found that the FEC
Commissioners exercised nonlegislative rulemaking and adjudica-
tory powers, which only "officers" could exercise, and held that the
President must appoint these "officers." Although the Court ap-
parently retreated from its holding in Humphrey's Executor"2 and
placed the "independent" status of agencies in question, this is not
the case." 3 Congress, by appointing the FEC Commissioners, was
attemting to "bootstrap" itself into a position of superiority over
the Executive.14 The Buckley Court recognized Congress' attempt
to circumvent one of the express checks on its power to shape the
government" 5 and, therefore, was justified in holding the statute
unconstitutional. Although most commentators have focused on
the formalistic language of the Buckley Court,"16 the Court's re-
quirement of a strict "separation of powers as a vital check against
tyranny"11 is justified in light of the continuous struggle over the
tremendous power inherent in the Constitution. The conclusion
that the balance of powers is upset by the independent agency
does not flow from this decision. The separation of governmental
power controls an independent agency and ensures that the agency
will not operate unchecked.
Creation of an agency, regardless of its independence, requires
109. "[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint. . . all other Officers of the United States. . .which shall be estab-
lished by Law. ... U.S. CONsT. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
110. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143.
111. See supra text accompanying note 78 (giving the Buckley Court's definition of
"Officer").
112. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). See supra notes 36-
40 and accompanying text for a discussion of Humphrey's Executor.
113. Contra Note, supra note 7, at 1777.
114. The Court stated that Congress was having it both ways: creating an agency inde-
pendent from the Executive but not from the Legislative branch. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 118.
115. See supra note 30.
116. The Court stated that it was the "intent of the Framers that the powers of the
three great branches. . . be largely separate from one another." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 120.
117. Id. at 121
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passage of enabling legislation by both houses of Congress and pre-
sentment to the President."8 Thus, the President can veto con-
gressional attempts to create an agency with excessive power or
with goals that oppose those of the President. While Congress po-
tentially may override a presidential veto, the President's power of
appointment still ensures that the exercise of congressionally dele-
gated powers is within the limits of the general welfare and is car-
ried out by an allied administrator." 9 The advice and consent
clause is available to Congress if the President attempts to appoint
an individual whose exercise of the agency's power would not com-
ply with congressional intent. Failure of an existing agency or offi-
cial to perform according to statute or in accordance with a change
of congressional will can result in the repeal or modification of the
agency's enabling statute. Such a response, however, also is subject
to presidential veto.
The Buckley decision did no more than return the balance of
powers, which Congress had disturbed, to the status quo. The Su-
preme Court's decision in Humphrey's Executor envisioned the
struggle among the branches yet had the prudence to allow Con-
gress to shape the government knowing that the balance of powers
would not be upset. Maintenance of the balance of powers, the un-
derlying structure of the Constitution, is more deserving of contin-
ued support than "isolated clauses or single Articles torn from
context.'
'20
B. INS v. Chadha
Many commentators have interpreted INS v. Chadha,'21 the
celebrated legislative veto122 case, and its companions 2 3 as bring-
118. See supra note 97.
119. With the introduction of a formal definition of "Officer" under the Constitution,
one can argue that Congress now may extend, through statute, its advice and consent power
to a larger number of administrative officials. One must also remember that the loophole of
creating "inferior" officers to circumvent the appointments power is now closed. Thus the
entire system of checks and balances has now been strengthened-but not formalized. See
supra note 79.
120. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952). This attitude
is best labeled interpretistic in that it argues that policy should not be sacrificed for a nar-
row reading of the text.
121. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
122. A legislative veto is a device used to prevent agency action from having the force
of law. The legislative veto is similar to a Presidential veto, except the device is available to
either or both houses, or a committee of Congress without presentment to the President.
See Elliott, The Administrative Constitution, The Constitution, and The Legislative Veto,
1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 126 & n.8.
123. Two other cases were decided without opinion by the Supreme Court along with
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ing the era of the administrative state to a close."" In Chadha12 5
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional Congress' use of the leg-
islative veto to overturn an executive decision to suspend126 an
alien's deportation under the provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
2 7
Chief Justice Burger's "syllogistic" opinion 12s managed to in-
validate more laws 129 in one opinion than the Court had invali-
dated in its entire history and, as a result, reversed fifty years1
30 of
constitutional law. The Court found that Congress, in exercising
the legislative veto,'3' had acted in its "legislative" capacity," 2 yet
had failed to conform to the "[e]xplicit and unambiguous provi-
sions of the Constitution" 1 3 requiring bicameral passage and pre-
sentment to the President.134 While recognizing that the branches
are not to be "'hermetically' sealed from one another""35 the Court
maintained that "[t]he hydraulic pressure inherent within each of
the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even
to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.""3 Here, Con-
gress exceeded its legislative power by circumventing the Presi-
Chadha, each holding the use of the legislative veto unconstitutional. In Consumer's Union
Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), the legislative veto was held un-
constitutional when used in connection with FTC rulemaking. Because of the FTC's inde-
pendent nature, the commentary generally has concluded that the Supreme Court doubts
the validity of the agency independence.
124. See supra note 3.
125. See Note, supra note 7, at 1780; ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 3, app. B at 1; Strauss, supra note 63.
126. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1245(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). Section
144 (a)(1) of the Act provided for suspension of deportation in cases of hardship.
127. Id. § 1254(c)(2). Section 244(c)(2) of the Act authorized either house of Congress,
by resolution, to reverse the decision of the Attorney General to suspend deportation
proceedings.
128. See Elliott, supra note 122, at 126.
129. Justice White in his dissent to Chadha estimated that the Court invalidated some
200 statutes. 462 U.S. 919, 967 (White, J., dissenting).
130. The first legislative veto was used in 1932. See Abourezk, The Congressional
Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives,
52 IND. L. REV. 323, 324 (1977), cited in Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-45.
131. The Court had to surmount several procedural hurdles to reach the merits of the
case, including finding that the INS was an "aggrieved party" for case or controversy needs
and finding that an alternative ground for relief, Chadha's marriage to a U.S. citizen, need
not be considered. See Elliott, supra note 129, at 130.
132. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. The Court reasoned that since the action had the effect
of altering legal rights and was not enumerated in one of the express exceptions to article I
the actions were "essentially legislative in purpose and effect." Id.
133. Id. at 945.
134. Id. at 957.
135. Id. at 951 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1975)).
136. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
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dent's veto power, though arguably in an attempt to improve the
function of government through agency accountability. Thus, the
Court realized that the most important reason to restrain Con-
gress' ability to structure the form of the administrative agencies is
the need to maintain the tensions and interactions among the
three branches of government delineated in the Constitution.
The Court's recognition that an agency's action under legisla-
tively delegated authority is subject to both judicial review and
legislative amendment or repeal 37 indicates a continued willing-
ness by the Court to allow a flexible form of government as long as
constitutional requirements are observed. Although these require-
ments may "impose burdens of governmental processes that often
seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable,"13 the form of govern-
ment at the apex must conform to the letter of the Constitution
despite "the fact that a given law is useful in facilitating functions
of government."I s" Adherence to these requirements will ensure
that the structure of the Constitution is upheld.
Some have argued that when new issues such as the legislative
veto or the Court's judicial powers are not at issue, 4 ' the Court
will use a formalistic approach to the problem of separation of
powers."" This argument is not applicable to the decision in
Chadha. As in Buckley v. Valeo 42 the Chadha Court recognized
an attempt by a coordinate branch of government to extend its
powers beyond those designated by the Constitution. The system
of checks and balances that the Court viewed as protection "from
the improvident exercise of power"'143 was out of balance when
Congress possessed the legislative veto. The legislative veto's pres-
ence, like Congress' attempts to make appointments of "Officers"
that were at issue in Buckley,14 4 denies the executive branch its
137. Id. at 953 n.16.
138. Id. at 959.
139. See id.
140. See Braveman, Chadha: The Supreme Court As Umpire in Separation of Powers
Disputes, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 735, 737 (1984). Braveman believes that policy arguments
surrounding separation of powers will only be considered when the Court powers are at issue
and generally will result in a favorable decision to its own interest.
141. See Elliott, supra note 122, at 147. Elliott views the process of constitutional
jurisprudence as one of "anchoring and adjusting." After the Court issues a formal opinion
when first confronted with the issue, a process of adjustment follows that allows the Court
to adapt to new situations it faces that involve the same issue.
142. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975) (per curiam); see supra notes 112-13 and
accompanying text.
143. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 at 957.
144. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the appoint-
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proper function in the constitutional process. The legislative veto
provided Congress with an unfettered ability to nullify executive
policy directives in the administrative forum. By circumventing
the executive veto, Congress could control not only Executive ap-
pointees, but also appointees to agencies that were designed and
established to be independent. Independent agencies, whose estab-
lishment is a jealously guarded power, should remain, both politi-
cally and practically, as independent as the Constitution will
allow.
14 5
C. Bowsher v. Synar
1. The Supreme Court Opinion
In the celebrated Gramm-Rudman'1 6 decision, Bowsher v.
Synar,417 the Supreme Court denied the constitutionality of spe-
cific provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act (the Act)"". These provisions, the Court found, uncon-
stitutionally delegated to the Comptroller General 149 the authority
to calculate and report certain budget reduction requirements to
the President, who would then be forced to carry them out through
sequestration orders. 150 The Court found that this delegation vio-
ment power and its relevance in the administrative area.
145. See supra notes 10-11 (discussing the need to allow for agency independence).
146. See supra note 4.
147. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
148. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985) [hereinafter the Act or Gramm-
Rudman].
149. The Comptroller General's position was created by the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921, Pub.L.No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1921). The Comptroller is appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 31 U.S.C. § 703(a)(1) (1982).
150. Congress designed the Act to reverse the spiral of growing federal deficits that
have been threatening the nation's economy. Federal budget deficits were reported to have
increased sevenfold since 1979. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1985). The detailed provisions of the Act set forth a process by which
budget deficit amounts for each of the fiscal years 1986 through 1991 are calculated by the
Directors of OMB and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The estimates are based on
independent economic and revenue projections as developed by each office. The estimates
are compared with "maximum deficit amounts" specified in the Act with an accompanying
program-by-program budget reduction calculation. Subsequently, the Directors jointly sub-
mit these figures to the Comptroller General who is charged with resolving any differences
in the budget reduction calculations. The Comptroller presents his report to the President
and Congress. Section 252 of the Act requires the President to order the budget reductions
through sequestration orders. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 76, re-
printed in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 988, 994 [hereinafter CONF. REP.]; see also
Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (D.D.C.), afl'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar,
106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). The Act also contained a fallback provision providing that, should
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lated the separation of powers doctrine.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
when considering the claim 151 that the Act violated the separation
of powers doctrine by assigning the reporting responsibilities to the
Comptroller General, focused on a section of the Budget and Ac-
counting Act of 1921152 which provides that the Comptroller Gen-
eral is removeable by a joint resolution of Congress1 53 for specified
cause after notice and hearing.15 4 Reaching the merits, 55 the dis-
the primary mechanism be declared invalid, the OMB and CBO would report directly to
Congress. Congress then would decide whether the enact a joint resolution meeting the defi-
cit targets in the Act. See Act, supra note 153, § 274.
151. Immediately after the President signed the Act into law, Representative Mike
Synar and eleven other members of the House invoked the Act's judicial review provision
and filed suit to challenge the Act, primarily on grounds of excessive delegation. Synar, 626
F. Supp. at 1378. The National Treasury Employees Union instituted an identical action,
alleging that its members were injuured as a result of the Act's automatic spending reduc-
tion provisions. These provisions operated to suspend cost-of-living adjustments otherwise
due federal retirees. Id. The nominal defendent was the United States. The Comptroller
General, the Speaker of the House, and other members of Congress were permitted to inter-
vene for the purpose of defending the Act. Id.; see INS. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983)
(discussing the ability of members of Congress to defend legislation). Standing for members
of Congress is based on a "congressional standing" doctrine that recognizes the personal
interest of members of Congress in the exercise of their governmental powers. See Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1258 (1985)(vacated as moot in light
of Bowsher).
After finding that the plaintiffs had standing, the district court dismissed their conten-
tion that the Act unconstitutionally delegates the appropriations powers to administrative
officials. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1383. While recognizing the questionable viability of the
nondelegation doctrine, see supra notes 24-25, the court addressed the contention that the
appropriations function is a core function so fundamental to this system of government that
it is per se nondelegable. The court rejected this argument for several reasons, see id. at
1385-87, the most significant being that the appropriations function was indistinguishable
from the taxing power, and delegation of the taxing function previously had been upheld.
See J.W. Hampton, Jr. Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1925). In addition, the district
court stated that a "core function" test would be without standards and would merely shift
the focus of controversy. See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944) (not-
ing that Congress "is not confined to that method of executing its policy which involves the
least possible delegation of discretion to administrative officials").
152. See supra note 149.
153. The joint resolution "requires an affirmative vote by both Houses and submission
to the President for approval." 7 L. DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HousE OF REPRESENTA-
TwES 333 (1977), quoted in Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3204, (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 3210 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that because this type of
removal is tantamount to new legislation, it comports with both the form and substance of
the constitutional requirements for separation of powers).
154. The provision governing the Comptroller General's removal states:
A Comptroller General . . . may be removed at any time by (A) impeachment; or (B)
joint resolution of Congress, after notice and on hearing, only for-(i) permanent disa-
bility; (ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony or conduct
involving moral turpitude.
31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1) (1982).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:903
trict court held that the Act assigned executive functions to the
Comptroller General and that "congressional removal power can-
not be approved with regard to an officer who actually participates
in the execution of the laws."'"" The court, rather than invalidating
the removal provision,"' concluded that "executive powers . . .
cannot constitutionally be exercised by an officer removeable by
Congress. . . and therefore the automatic deficit reduction process
.. . cannot be implemented.' ' 5
In reaching this conclusion the district court found that the
Act granted the Comptroller powers that were neither "purely ex-
ecutive," requiring the President's discretion for removal,15 9 nor
entirely independent of the executive branch, warranting treat-
ment similar to Humphrey's Executor.'6 0 The court reasoned fur-
ther that this mixture of Executive and non-Executive powers was
impermissible when combined with the Budget and Accounting
Act removal provision,' 6' which denies the President direct in-
volvement in the decision.
162
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion6 3 in Bowsher upheld
155. The defendants attempted to persuade the Court that because Congress had not
attempted to exercise the removal power granted to it in the statute, the question was not
ripe for adjudication. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1392. The court determined that this argument
was flatly contradicted by the decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (invalidating certain grants of authority under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978 to bankruptcy judges who were not appointed pursuant to Article III of
the Constitution).
156. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1401.
157. Upon determining that the powers granted the Comptroller General under the
Act could not be performed by an Officer removable by Congress, the court faced the choice
of invalidating either the portion of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 which created
the Comptroller's position or the portion of the Gramm-Rudman Act which gave the Comp-
troller the authority to determine the budget reduction amounts. Judicial precendent to aid
the court was sparse. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 50. The Court determined that the
legislative history of the Act and the inclusion of the fallback provision indicated Congress'
desire to have adjudicated the validity of the Gramm-Rudman Act, and not the Budget and
Accounting Act. See Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1394.
158. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1403.
159. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935).
160. According to the Humphrey's Executor Court, an independent Officer is one who
"occupies no place in the Executive department and who exercises no part of the executive
power vested by the Constitution in the President." Id. at 628. The Supreme Court in
Humphrey's Executor upheld Congress' power to restrict the President's ability to remove
the FTC Commissioner. See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 154. This provision is distinguishable from the provision involved
in Humphrey's Executor because the FTC Commissioner could be removed only by the
President for cause. See supra note 37.
162. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1403.
163. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist and
O'Conner. The court's membership has changed since the publication of the Synar opinion.
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the district court's decision and found that the Act violated the
separation of powers doctrine."" The Supreme Court rejected as
inconsistent with the notion of separation of powers the argument
that Congress' role in the removal of the Comptroller General
should extend beyond the impeachment powers'6 5 enumerated in
the Constitution.16 In so holding, the Court found that the Act
bestowed executive powers on the Comptroller 6 7 and, conse-
quently, improperly vested executive powers in an officer remova-
ble by Congress. 68 The Court stated very clearly that the instant
opinion was to have no effect on the status of "independent" agen-
cies because independent agency administrators are removable by
the President for cause while the Comptroller General is remove-
able by joint resolution.169
Relying on the Court's earlier decision in INS v. Chadha; °70
the Bowsher majority reasoned that despite the statutory require-
ment of a joint resolution with presentment to the President to
accomplish removal, the threat of congressional removal rendered
the Comptroller General subservient to the legislative branch. The
Court found that this potential for removal impermissibly usurped
executive branch functions.' 17 The Court also rejected the argu-
ment that, both practically and politically, the Comptroller Gen-
eral was independent of Congress. According to the Court, Con-
gress created the Comptroller General's position because "it
believed that it 'needed an officer, responsible to it alone, to check
upon the application of public funds in accordance with
appropriations.' ,,172
After determining that the Comptroller General was an agent
of Congress, the Court had to define the extent to which the Act
Justice Rehnquist has replaced Chief Justice Burger and Antonin Scalia has joined the
Court. Justice Scalia was one of the members of the three-judge district court panel in the
Synar case. Although the district court opinion was issued per curiam, it is widely believed
that Justice Scalia authored the opinion.
164. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3194 (1986).
165. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
166. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3186.
167. See supra note 150 (describing function of Comptroller General under the Act).
168. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
169. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3188 n.4.
170. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
171. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3189. The Court found that the statutory justifications for
removal (inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance) were too broad in their scope and
would render the Comptroller General removable "for any number of actual or perceived
transgressions of the legislative will." Id. at 598.
172. Id. at 3191, quoting H. MANSFIELD, THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL: A STUDY IN THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION 65 (1939).
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permitted the Comptroller to interfere with executive branch ac-
tivities. The Court determined that "[i]nterpreting a law enacted
by Congress to implement the legislative mandate [represented]
the very essence of 'execution' of the law.'1 73 The Court found that
the Act gave the Comptroller General "ultimate authority to deter-
mine the budget cuts [and commanded] the President himself to
carry out, without slightest variation .. . the directive of the
Comptroller General."'174 The Court, therefore, determined that
the Act frustrated the executive branch's ability to carry out the
laws because the Act allowed an agent of Congress to perform ex-
ecutive functions. 175 While the Court recognized Congress' ability
to provide for appropriations through legislation, the Court re-
jected Congress' further participation in the process through
means other than subsequent legislation.
2. Analysis
The Bowsher decision illustrates two significant developments
in the Court's attitude toward the independent agency. First, the
Court apparently is willing to allow delegation of "executive" pow-
ers to officers who are not removable at the President's will. This
willingness is evidenced by the majority's attempt to distinguish
the removal provision challenged here from those present in the
enabling statutes of independent agencies. 7 6 Further evidence of
this willingness is the Court's reliance on its decision in Chadha to
characterize the Comptroller's actions under the Act as legislative,
and therefore impermissible, because the actions were not per-
formed pursuant to the bicameralism and presentment clause. 1
77
173. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
174. Id. The Act provides that:
The [Presidential] order must provide for reductions in the manner specified in section
251(a)(3), must incorporate the provisions of the [Comptroller General's] report sub-
mitted under section 251(b), and must be consistent with such report in all respects.
The President may not modify or recalculate any of the estimates, determinations,
specifications, bases, amounts, or precentages set forth in the report submitted under
section 251(b) in determining the reductions to be specified in the order with respect to
programs, projects, and activities, or with respect to budget activities, within an ac-
count ... .
Id., quoting Act, supra note 148, § 252(a)(3) (emphasis added by the Court).
175. 106 S. Ct. at 3192. Like the district court, the Supreme Court found that invali-
dating the Budget and Accounting Act removal provision was inappropriate and instead
chose to rely on the presence of the fallback provision in Gramm-Rudman as evidence of
congressional desire to resort to the fallback provision rather than invalidate the removal
provision. Id. at 3193.
176. Id. at 3188 n.4.
177. Id. at 3189.
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Second, both the Supreme Court and the district court demon-
strated the difficulty of classifying the functions of an agency ad-
ministrator under specific legislation.
Regarding the continued acceptance of the independent form
of administrative agencies, both the majority and concurring opin-
ions in Bowsher emphasize that the independent agency is still a
viable entity in the government structure. The majority addressed
Congress' ability to control an independent agency, not Congress'
ability to create such an agency. According to the Court, the struc-
ture of the Constitution does not allow congressional control over
powers previously delegated. As demonstrated above, 18 the inde-
pendent agency is fully protected from interference by both the
President and Congress. As in Chadha, the Bowsher Court felt
that Congress had attempted to assert its authority over a coequal
branch of government. Fearing an upset of the balance of powers
at the apex of government, the Court struck down the violative
provisions of the Act. As Justice Stevens' concurrence points out,
the Constitution sets out the prescribed method for lawmaking by
Congress; allowing a congressional agent to circumvent these provi-
sions is tantamount to allowing Congress to circumvent the consti-
tutional requirements. 7" However, the independent agencies, when
exercising their powers, do not present the same problem. These
agencies represent a cooperative effort on the part of Congress and
the Executive to adapt and conform government to society's expec-
tations. The independent agency's own authority is subject to the
full extent of structural constitutional constraints, and neither
branch receives an advantage from the presence of these agencies.
The activities of the agencies represent a lawful delegation of legis-
lative power, properly granted pursuant to the necessary and
proper clause, and an accompanying congressional policy decision
concerning who should exercise that power. 80
The Court, however, erred in concluding that the Comptroller
General is an agent of Congress. As Justice White points out in his
178. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
179. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3205. (Stevens, J., concurring).
180. No one should doubt the validity of delegating power to the Executive, for unless
that delegation usurps the powers of the judiciary, all branches of government should recog-
nize Congress' ability to delegate its legislative authority. Both Congress and the President
are estopped from challenging the legislation because, assuming it was passed lawfully, the
full extent of constitutional checks and balances will have been utilized. Any attempt by the
Supreme Court to invalidate this type of legislation would represent a policy decision on the




dissent, the majority simply must have ignored the fact that re-
moval of the Comptroller could not be accomplished without what
amounts to new legislation-bicameral approval and presentment
to the President."' To conclude that the Comptroller is subject to
the threats of Congress completely ignores that a joint resolution
requires presentment to the President for approval or veto. Al-
though a congressional override of a Presidential veto is possible, it
is complete folly to believe that the Comptroller is any less inde-
pendent than the FTC Commissioner, whose removal could be ac-
complished at the request of only one branch of government-the
executive branch.182 As the Court noted in Chadha,83 removal by
joint resolution is congressional "action taken in accordance with
[the] 'single finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure
established by Art. I. . . [and] should be presumptively viewed as
a legitimate exercise of legislative power.' ",184
The Court's decision, however, is justified to the extent that it
reflects a desire to maintain equilibrium at the apex of governmen-
tal power. Given the realities of contemporary government, the
Court must abandon the notion that the Constitution embodies a
neat division of government into three separate branches. The por-
tion of government below the apex was left undefined in the expec-
tation that Congress would exercise appropriate judgment in deter-
mining its shape. As long as Congress, through the administrative
state, does not upset the balance of power at the apex, its discre-
tion should be accorded a great degree of deference.
181. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3209-10 (White, J., dissenting). According to Justice
White:
[R]emoval of the Comptroller under the statute satisfies the requiements of bicamera-
lism and presentment laid down in Chadha. The majority's citation of Chadha for the
proposition that Congress may only control the acts of officers of the United States "by
passing new legislation," in no sense casts doubt on the legitimacy of the removal pro-
vision, for that provision allows Congress to effect removal only through action that
constitutes legislation as defined in Chadha.
To the extent it has any bearing on the problem before us, Chadha would ...
suggest the legitimacy of the statutory provision making the Comptroller removable
through joint resolution, for the Court's opinion in Chadha reflects the view that the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I represent the principal assur-
ances that Congress will remain within its legislative role in the constitutionally pre-
scribed scheme of separated powers.
Id. at 3210 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
182. "[T]he President has long possessed a comparable power to remove members of
the [FTC], yet it is universally accepted that they are independent. . . ... Id. at 3195 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).




The second development arising out of the Bowsher decision is
the realization by both the district court and the Supreme Court
that the ability to classify the functions of an agency "rests on the
. ..unsound premise that there is a definite line that distinguishes
executive power from legislative power.' 1 85 Further attempts by
the Court to define the delegated functions of agencies will result
in greater confusion over the place of agencies in government. In
analyzing the functions of the Comptroller General under Gramm-
Rudman, the Court appeared to indicate that the Comptroller's
functions would be "'executive' if performed by the Comptroller
General, but 'legislative' if performed by the Congress."'18 6 The dis-
trict court previously concluded that the Comptroller General's au-
thority fell somewhere between the executive and legislative cate-
gories 187  and admitted that attempts to determine whether
executive or nonexecutive powers "predominate" is "neither [a] ju-
dicially manageable nor congressionally knowable standard[]."'I "
The Supreme Court's inability to classify the activities performed
by administrative agencies was first demonstrated in Humphrey's
Executor when the Court was forced to "retreat to the qualifying
'quasi' ,189 to describe the FTC's functions. 190
Attempts by the Court to characterize the functions of an
agency as legislative, executive, or judicial are no more than dis-
guised delegation doctrine challenges. The Court's ability to char-
acterize the functions performed by an agency is no easier than its
ability to determine whether the delegation is too broad. 191 As the
Court recognizes the problems inherent in attempting further char-
acterization of agency functions, the Court should give greater def-
erence to congressional delegation decisions. This realization,
therefore, should further solidify the independent agencies' place
in government.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is
the first lower court to address the problem of characterizing func-
185. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3200 (Stevens, J., concurring).
186. Id.
187. Synar, 525 F. Supp. at 1401 (the court stated that the Comptroller's authority
fell in "no-man's land").
188. Id. at 1401.
189. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ruberiod Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing) (cited in Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3207 n.3 (White, J., dissenting)).
190. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
191. The district court in Synar recognized this when it rejected the plaintiff's "core
function" challenge to the delegation of powers under Gramm-Rudman to the Comptroller.
See Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1385.
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tions delegated to an agency that is neither executive nor indepen-
dent. Ameron v. United States Army Corps of Engineers9 2 re-
quired the Third Circuit to determine whether the Comptroller
General was the proper agent to enforce the Competition in Con-
tracting Act 9 3 (CICA). The CICA empowers the Comptroller to
suspend the procurement timetable for federal agencies for an in-
definite period when a dispute arises between an agency and a dis-
appointed contractor. 9 4 After a hearing to determine the merits of
the dispute, the Comptroller is required to issue a nonbinding rec-
ommendation for resolution of the dispute. 95 In Ameron the Corps
of Engineers challenged the constitutionality of the CICA, arguing
that, given the Supreme Court's determination that the Comptrol-
ler is a member of the legislative branch, the Comptroller's suspen-
sion of the procurement timetable was an unconstitutional "execu-
tion of the laws."' 98
The Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the procure-
ment delay by distinguishing the Comptroller's authority under
the CICA from its authority under Gramm-Rudman. 197 The court,
however, found the characterization of functions under the CICA
to be frustrating. The court was forced to determine whether the
Comptroller's power under the CICA usurped the President's au-
thority to excute laws'98 and whether the Comptroller actually was
executing the laws by controlling the procurement process. 99 The
Third Circuit opinion did not analyze the impact the Comptroller's
other duties would have, when combined with those under the
CICA, on his status under the Constitution.
192. 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986). This opinion was issued after the Synar decision was
published upon a rehearing by the panel.
193. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (Supp. II 1986).
194. Id. §§ 3553-3554. CICA allows the Comptroller to invoke an automatic 90 day
suspension that may be modified as required by the facts of the case.
195. Id.
196. Ameron, 809 F.2d at 982. In addition the Corps of Engineers argued that the
Comptroller's activities were an impermissable interference with the executive branch.
197. Id. at 997-98. The Third Circuit argued that the CICA did not empower the
Comptroller to bind the executive branch as did Gramm-Rudman but instead allowed the
Comptroller to make nonbinding recommendations.
198. See id. at 993 n.9. The panel had little trouble determining that CICA was a valid
exercise of legislative authority in light of Congress' need to watch over the procurement
process.
199. See id. at 994 n.10. The court found that the Comptroller's actions under CICA
were not "executive" in nature, and therefore upheld the law because the Comptroller is
restricted to making recommendations. Although a report to Congress is required if those
recommendations are not followed, no restraint on the Comptroller's ability to complete the
procurement process was available. Id. at 994-96.
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The policy-oriented and outcome-determinative questions pre-
sent in an Ameron-type analysis dictate that the Supreme Court
should refrain from further investigations into the characterization
of agency functions. Just as the Court recognized the shortcomings
of delegation doctrine challenges to agency action, it also should
acknowledge the futility of attempting to neatly characterize
agency functions as legislative, executive, or judicial. Moreover,
questions persist as to the ability of Congress to label, either ex-
pressly or impliedly through legislative history, the functions of an
agency in order to preclude substantive judicial review. By recog-
nizing that independent agencies are proper participants in the
structuring of government, the Court can avoid the complications
involved in classifying actions as either executive, legislative, or
judicial.
The Supreme Court may not be able to avoid the question of
the independent agencies' constitutionality much longer. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently up-
held the FTC's ability to enforce the anti-fraud provisions of the
Federal Trade Commission Act and thus the Act's constitutional-
ity.200 In FTC v. American National Cellular"1 the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the FTC's attempt to enjoin the defendant's actions in
obtaining a cellular telephone license did not violate Article 11202 of
the Constitution. In upholding the FTC's authority, the court held
that enforcement of the Act must be performed by "Officers
'20 3 of
the United States and, relying on Bowsher, that the FTC Commis-
sioners were "Officers. ' 2 °4
Although this reasoning may have logical appeal, it lacks con-
stitutional support. Humphrey's Executor explicitly states that "to
the extent that [the FTC] exercises any executive function . . . it
does so in the discharge and effectuation of its quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial powers. 205 In addition, the Ninth Circuit reached
200. The FTC was seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief under § 13(b)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1982) for alleged false and mis-
leading statements under § 5(c) of the Act against the defendants in connection with cellu-
lar telephone licenses.
201. 810 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987).
202. The defendants alleged that the Act violated article II of the Constitution, specif-
ically §§ 1 and 3. The Constitution states: "The executive power shall be vested in a Presi-
dent of the United States of America. . . . [and] shall take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." U.S. CONST. art II, §§ 1, 2.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
204. American Nat'l Cellular, 810 F.2d at 1514.
205. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 628 (quoted in American Nat'l Cellular, 810
F.2d at 1515 (Tang, J., concurring)).
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the conclusion that the FTC Commissioners are "Officers" despite
the fact that they are not removable at wil1206 by the President." 7
While noting these two flaws in the majority opinion, Judge Tang
concurred in the result by focusing instead on the ability of Con-
gress to constitutionally delegate authority to administrative agen-
cies.2 °0 In so doing, Judge Tang recognized the flaw in relying on
cases like Chadha and Bowsher, cases in which the Supreme Court
was faced with attempts by Congress to circumvent the express
constitutional framework. 09 By emphasizing the authority of Con-
gress to "supervis[e] the various fields over which it enjoys consti-
tutional reign, ' 210 Judge Tang recognized the need to defer to Con-
gress' judgment when administering legislative goals.
V. CONCLUSION
As long as regulation of the economic sector of our society is
necessary, the original justifications for the independent agency
will remain vital. Congress and the courts are no better suited to
regulate the economic sector of society today than they were one
hundred years ago. Although independent agencies may suffer mi-
nor complications, the responsibility for resolving these problems
rests with Congress.
Although not specifically provided for in the Constitution, in-
dependent agencies are not prohibited by the language of the doc-
ument. As has been demonstrated, independent agencies rarely
overstep their statutory limits and do not upset the inevitable
struggle between the branches of government. As Congress discov-
ered in the companion cases21' to Chadha, the agencies also are
independent from their creator.
Independent agencies are constrained sufficiently by the pow-
ers granted to each of the three enumerated branches. No other
constraints, least of all those outside the Constitution, should be
introduced into the system of checks and balances. By subjecting
Congress' power to delegate authority to the type of judicial scru-
206. See supra note 37.
207. 810 F.2d at 1514.
208. Id. at 1516-17 (Tang, J., concurring).
209. The decision in Chadha clearly represents an effort by the Court to reject Con-
gress' attempt to undermine the Presdient's authority by bootstrapping itself into a superior
branch of government. The same is not true for Bowsher, because, as argued above, the
Comptroller General is as independent as an FTC Commissioner and, therefore, does not
pose the same threat to the balance of power.
210. 810 F.2d at 1517 (Tang, J., concurring).
211. See supra note 123.
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tiny found in Synar and Ameron, the Supreme Court will render
Congress subservient to the Executive. The Court should restrain
Congress' legislative power only when faced with attempts to cir-
cumvent the structure of checks and balances or the express con-
straints contained in the Constitution. As long as independent
agencies are viewed as subject to the same constraints as the three
enumerated branches, their existence and Congress' authority to
create them should be protected. Viewed in this light, the indepen-
dent agency is not a "fourth branch," but merely a creature of
Congress' constitutional power to shape the government.
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